This paper measures the e¤ect of monetary tightening in key advanced economies on net capital ‡ows around the world. Measuring this e¤ect is complicated by the fact that the domestic monetary policies of a¤ected economies respond endogenously to the foreign tightening shock. Using a structural VAR framework with quarterly panel data we estimate the impulse responses of domestic policy variables and net capital ‡ows to a foreign monetary tightening shock. We …nd that the endogenous response of domestic monetary policy depends on each economy's capital account openness and exchange rate regime. We use a method to compute counterfactual impulse responses for net capital out ‡ows under the assumption that the domestic policy rate does not respond to foreign monetary tightening. Our results suggests that failing to account for the endogenous response of domestic monetary policy biases down the estimated elasticity of net capital ‡ows to foreign interest rates by as much as one-third for countries with open capital accounts.
Introduction
As monetary policy in key advanced economies begins to normalize after having persisted at exceptionally accommodative levels for nearly 10 years, it is natural to ask what e¤ect this normalization will have on world …nancial markets. In particular, what is the e¤ect of monetary tightening on the volume of net capital ‡ows around the world? How do the a¤ected economies respond to foreign monetary tightening, and how does the response vary across economies? And …nally, how can one disentangle the impact of foreign monetary normalization from that of the domestic policy responses on net capital in ‡ows?
These questions may appear simple, but the measurement is not, because any attempt to quantify the impact of foreign monetary tightening on net capital ‡ows is complicated by the fact that the response of domestic monetary policy in recipient countries is endogenous.
The existing literature implies that, all else equal, higher interest rates in countries such as the United States reduce the net capital in ‡ows to recipient economies.
1 However, the extent of capital ‡ight depends not just on the foreign monetary shock, but also on the domestic policy responses that are endogenous to the foreign shock. In fact, central banks are likely to raise interest rates and sell foreign exchange reserves following a monetary tightening in order to stem capital ‡ight and local currency depreciation. Moreover, the endogenous policy response is likely to vary across countries depending on their capital account and exchange rate regimes.
Due to these complications, failing to account for the endogenous response of domestic monetary policy to foreign tightening is likely to understate the impact on capital ‡ows, since the domestic response mitigates the full impact of the foreign shock. Moreover, by not accounting for important cross-sectional di¤erences in the type and intensity of domestic policy responses, the literature is likely to miss the heterogeneous impact of foreign monetary tightening across recipient countries.
To rigorously quantify the impact of foreign monetary tightening on capital ‡ows, we follow a two-step approach using a structural vector auto-regressive (SVAR) framework with panel data from 54 advanced and emerging market economies at the quarterly frequency from 1975:Q1 to 2015:Q4. There are ten variables in this structural VAR. The …rst four are foreign variables from large "base" countries/regions like the United States or the Euro Area, with each base country corresponding to one of the countries in our sample. The foreign variables include GDP growth, in ‡ation, energy price in ‡ation, and the policy interest rate.
By controlling for foreign variables such as GDP growth and in ‡ation, we can identify shocks to the foreign interest rate in the base country relevant for each country in our sample.
The remaining six variables in the SVAR framework are domestic variables for the 54 countries in our sample, and include GDP growth, in ‡ation, net capital ‡ows, the change in the exchange rate, central bank reserve accumulation, and the policy interest rate. Using this speci…cation we can plot the response of domestic variables, including net capital out ‡ows, to the foreign monetary policy shock in the relevant base country. This is the …rst step in our two-step approach.
In the second step we construct a series of hypothetical shocks to the domestic policy interest rate that would prevent the domestic rate from responding to the foreign monetary policy shock. These shocks are calibrated to cancel out the endogenous monetary response of the domestic central bank. They allow us to compute counterfactual impulse responses for every domestic variable in the model, and thus to infer the response of net capital out ‡ows to the foreign monetary policy shock had there been no endogenous reaction of the domestic central bank. Importantly, to examine the variation in policy responses across country groups, we repeat the exercise for four country groups given by the interaction between ‡oating/…xed exchange rate regimes and open/closed capital accounts, using the corresponding classi…cations from Klein and Shambaugh (2015) and Chinn and Ito (2008) .
3
The literature using counterfactuals in a structural VAR goes back to Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) and Sims and Zha (1998, 2006 These results are important because they show the extent to which the elasticity of capital ‡ows to foreign monetary policy decisions is understated if one fails to take into account the endogenous responses of domestic monetary policy. They also establish an intuitive relationship between the true elasticity of capital ‡ows to foreign interest rates and country-level characteristics such as the level of capital account restrictions.
Literature
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, our results add to the literature on the drivers of cross-border capital ‡ows. Namely, the estimates from regressions of capital in ‡ows on interest rates in recipient and source countries, or on their di¤erential, may be subject to a reverse causation bias to the extent that a slowdown in capital in ‡ows prompts the local central bank to raise the policy rate. Clements and Kamil (2009), Ostry, Ghosh, Habermeier, Chamon, Qureshi, and Reinhardt (2010) , Forbes and Warnock (2012) , Ghosh, Qureshi, Kima, and Zalduendo (2014) ).
Third, our results are consistent with the policy trilemma, which states that a country cannot at the same time have (1) an independent monetary policy, (2) a …xed exchange rate regime, and (3) an open capital account (see Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962) Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2005) , and Klein and Shambaugh (2015) regress changes in the policy interest rate in one country on changes in a base country's interest rate. These papers …nd that the coe¢ cient in this regression is signi…cantly higher in countries with a pegged currency than in those with a ‡oating currency, and in countries with open than with closed capital account. Hofmann and Takats (2015) …nd similar results in a sample of more recent, quarterly data. However, as in (Rey 2015) , our results also suggest that even countries with a ‡oating exchange rate tie their domestic monetary policy, at least partially, to that in base countries like the United States, which we …nd to be the case especially
for countries with open capital accounts. Pasricha, Falagiarda, Bijsterbosch, and Aizenman (2015) show in a SVAR framework that active use of capital controls can lead to greater monetary policy autonomy, and Davis and Presno (2017) show the same in a DSGE model. Fourth, our paper is related to the literature documenting the macroeconomic e¤ects of di¤erent trilemma choices (see Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2011); Forbes and Klein (2015) ).
The sizeable responses of domestic monetary policy to foreign monetary tightening, which in our results could lead to as much as 10 basis points of additional increase in interest rates over two years for ‡oaters and 35 basis points for peggers to every 100 basis points of foreign tightening, place urgency on considering the e¤ects of reduced monetary policy autonomy on domestic output and in ‡ation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the econometric setup for the SVAR model and presents the dataset. Section 3 discusses the results, which contrast the observed impulse responses for net capital out ‡ows and exchange rates to the counterfactual impulse responses that shut down the endogenous response of domestic monetary policy. Section 4 concludes.
2 Econometric methodology and data
Econometric Methodology
We calculate impulse responses using a SVAR model with panel data:
where Y t is a vector of four foreign variables from the relevant base countries and Y t is a vector of six domestic variables. The foreign variables in Y t include: the quarter over quarter (QoQ) log change in real GDP (y t ), the QoQ log change in the GDP de ‡ator ( t ), the QoQ log change in energy prices (e t ), and the level of the foreign policy interest rate (r t ). The domestic variables in Y t include: the QoQ log change in real GDP (y t ), the QoQ log change in the GDP de ‡ator ( t ), net capital out ‡ows excluding reserves (o t ), the QoQ log change in the exchange rate relative to the base country currency (xr t ), reserve accumulation (f x t ), and the level of the home policy interest rate (r t ). " t and " t are 4x1
and 6x1 vectors containing structural white-noise shocks. The quarterly net capital out ‡ows excluding reserves and reserve accumulation are both normalized by the four-quarter lag of GDP.
We assume that foreign variables in core countries are una¤ected by domestic variables or domestic shocks from the sample countries, either contemporaneously or with a lag, and thus we impose block restrictions that the entries in columns 5-10 in the …rst 4 rows of
To estimate the structural VAR, we …rst pre-multiply both sides of this equation by B 1 0 to obtain the reduced-form VAR:
We then perform a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals, Identi…cation through the recursive Cholesky identi…cation scheme requires one to specify an ordering of variables. We use the ordering given by the introduction of the variables above. When identifying the shock to the foreign interest rate, we order the foreign policy rate after all other foreign variables, and thus assume that the foreign policy rate is a¤ected by contemporaneous shocks to all other foreign variables, but it only a¤ects all other foreign variables with a lag.
We order all domestic variables after the foreign variables, so foreign variables can have a contemporaneous e¤ect on domestic variables. Furthermore the domestic policy interest rate is ordered last among all domestic variables, and thus assume that the domestic policy interest rate is a¤ected by contemporaneous shocks to all foreign and domestic variables, but it only a¤ects all other domestic variables with a lag.
In the results section, we begin by presenting impulse responses to a 100 basis point shock to the foreign policy interest rate, given by " 1 = [0; 0; 0; 1] 0 and " 1 = [0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0] 0 . As will be discussed, we …nd that the positive shock to the foreign policy interest rate leads to an endogenous increase in the domestic policy interest rate. To illustrate the extent to which this endogenous domestic policy response mitigates the rise in net capital out ‡ows following the foreign shock, we construct a counterfactual scenario by adding a series of hypothetical shocks to o¤set the endogenous domestic policy response. Thus, our counterfactual scenario mimics the case in which the domestic policy interest rate is held constant despite the foreign monetary tightening.
To construct the series of hypothetical shocks to the domestic policy interest rate, we begin with the SVAR in (1) 
in which we have written out the 6 domestic variables in Y t . Since all foreign variables are una¤ected by domestic shocks, we leave the vector of four foreign variables written as Y t .
In this setup, we consider a shock to the foreign policy rate at period t = 1. Since B 0 is lower triangular, this shock will a¤ect contemporaneously the domestic monetary policy rate. In the counterfactual scenario, to o¤set the domestic policy response, we introduce an additional structural shock" r 1 to the domestic policy rate, which is calibrated to ensure that the total response of the domestic policy rate is 0 in the …rst period: 9 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 (4) where a tilda "~" indicates the response of a variable under the counterfactual scenario that incorporates the counterfactual shock to the home policy rate. To calibrate the counterfactual shock to the home policy rate, we pre-multiply each side of the above equation by a row vector with ten columns, where each column is set at zero except for the tenth, which is set at one. By doing so, the above equation becomes: the counterfactual shock to the home policy rate in the …rst period that would be necessary to hold the home policy rate constant following the shock to the foreign policy rate.
The counterfactual shock is extended in all subsequent periods t > 1 in order to keep the domestic policy rate constant: 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 Our approach gives the series of counterfactual shocks to the home policy rate" r t that would be necessary to hold the home policy rate constant following a shock to the foreign policy rate.
Data
The full list of countries included in the panel VAR is presented in Table 1 . For each country in our sample, the table provides the "base" country used to pick the relevant foreign policy rate and the foreign currency against which to compute the exchange rate.
2 To measure the e¤ect of interest rate divergence on capital ‡ows and exchange rates, we designate such a base foreign country for each country in our sample, with the base considered to be the source of the exogenous monetary policy shock. Many studies have used the U.S. dollar as the base currency and the U.S. Fed Funds rate as the base country interest rate throughout the sample. However, it is plausible that the primary international relation for some of the countries in our sample is not with the United States, so to accurately measure the e¤ect of interest rate divergence on capital ‡ows, we designate a di¤erent base foreign country for each country in our sample.
We pair our countries to base countries like in Shambaugh (2004) . When a country pegs or partially pegs its currency to a base country's currency, the designation is straightforward (e.g., the peg of the Hong Kong dollar to the U.S. dollar). However, when the country does not peg, the designation is not trivial and requires a judgement call. Shambaugh (2004) bases this choice on historical relationships or proximity to a nearby dominant economy (e.g., Malaysia is the base country for Singapore, Australia is the base country for New Zealand, and India is the base country for Sri Lanka).
Except for one variable, all data series are from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. The one exception is the QoQ log change in energy prices, which is taken from the World Bank's energy price index. For domestic and foreign GDP growth and in ‡ation, we use the QoQ log change in the GDP volume index and de ‡ator. The data on private net capital out ‡ows and reserve accumulation at the quarterly frequency are from the IMF balance of payments (BPM6). Private net capital out ‡ows and reserve accumulation are both normalized by GDP, lagged 4 quarters. For the domestic and foreign interest rates, we use policy interest rates and, in a few cases depending on data availability, we use a short-term money market rate. When reporting the QoQ change in the exchange rates, an increase denotes local currency depreciation.
3
One challenge arises from the fact that in recent years, the central banks of our two major base countries, the Federal Reserve and the ECB, have used instruments other than the usual policy interest rate. To address this issue, we include the shadow short-term interest rates for the United States, the Euro Area, the United Kingdom, and Japan from Krippner (2013) .
For the United States, the Euro Area, and the United Kingdom, the Krippner shadow rate replaces the policy rate series from 2009 to the end of our sample in 2015. For Japan, the Krippner shadow rate replaces the policy rate from 1999 to the end of our sample.
Country-quarter observations are divided into four categories: (1) In a given year, a country is considered to have an open capital account if the value of the Chinn-Ito index for that year is greater than 0.5, and it is considered to have a closed capital account if the index is less than 0.5. 3 We removed outliers de…ned as follows: (1) Country-quarter observations where the absolute value of net capital ‡ows is greater than 20% of GDP. (2) Observations where net capital ‡ows are exactly zero (since many times statistical agencies would write zero for missing observations). (3) Observations where the absolute vale of the QoQ change in the interest rate is greater than 9%. (4) Observations where the absolute value of the QoQ change in the exchange rate is greater than 10%. Data cleaning restrictions (1), (3), and (4) help eliminate any obvious crisis or sudden stop episodes from the data set, which would be a source of outliers.
Both the currency index and the Chinn and Ito (2008) capital account openness index are annual, but the data in the VAR is at a quarterly frequency. Therefore, the values of the currency index and capital account openness index in a given year are assumed to apply to every quarter of that year. Also, it should be noted that the four groups include countryquarter observations, since a given country can transition between groups over time. For a country that moves toward liberalizing its capital account during the sample period, the country-quarter observations for that country may fall into the closed capital account groups early in the sample period, but switch to one of the open capital account groups later in the sample period. 
Results

Results from Structural VARs
The responses all domestic variables to a 100 b.p. shock to the foreign policy rate are presented in …gures 1-4. The most substantial di¤erences across the four groups of countries in …gures 1-4 concern the responses of the home country policy interest rate. In countries with a ‡oating currency, the home country policy rate does not change or increases by at most 10 b.p. following the 100 b.p. shock to the foreign interest rate, while in a country with a pegged currency the response of the home country policy rate is about 30-35 b.p. increase.
The fact that the home policy rate is much less responsive to shocks to the foreign policy rate in a country with a ‡oating currency is shown again in variance decomposition results in table 3. The table shows the percent of the forecast error variance of the home policy rate in each of the four groups of countries that is explained by shocks to each of the 10 variables in the model at 1-5 year forecast horizons. Thus, in countries with a ‡oating currency and an open capital account, only 1% of the forecast error variance of the home policy rate at a 5 year horizon is explained by shocks to the foreign policy rate. For countries with a ‡oating currency and a closed capital account this share falls to nearly 0%. Meanwhile, the share of the variance in the home policy rate explained by shocks to the foreign policy rate is much higher in countries with a pegged currency. In countries with a pegged currency and a relatively closed capital account the share is 12%, and in countries with a pegged currency and an open capital account this share rises to 19%.
As expected, open economies experience larger net capital out ‡ows and greater currency depreciation than closed ones in response to the foreign monetary tightening shock. Also, among open economies, ‡oaters lose less foreign exchange reserves than peggers, which re‡ects their softer foreign exchange intervention to curb their currency depreciation.
Results from Counterfactual VARs
In response to an increase in the foreign policy rate, the home country central bank may raise the policy interest rate in an attempt to mitigate some of the increase in net capital out ‡ows (or the fall in net in ‡ows) resulting from the divergence between the home and foreign interest rates. It is therefore natural to ask how successful this policy was in stemming the fall in net in ‡ows. What would net capital ‡ows have been in the absence of these domestic policy changes?
The counterfactual VAR model results discussed in this section can be used to plot the responses of net capital out ‡ows in each of the four country groups under the alternative scenario where the home country policy interest rate does not respond to the foreign policy interest rate shock. As described in the last section, we compute the counterfactual impulse responses by calibrating a series of shocks to the home country policy rate that would keep the home policy rate unchanged. The calibration of these is described in equation (7).
The calibrated shocks to the home country policy interest rate that would be necessary to keep the home country policy rate constant following the shock to the foreign interest rate are shown in …gure 5. The counterfactual shock necessary to keep the home policy rate constant is largest in the group with a pegged currency and an open capital account.
The hypothetical shocks are the second largest in countries with a pegged currency and a closed capital account. Meanwhile the hypothetical shock is small in countries with a ‡oating currency and an open capital account and the hypothetical shock is nearly zero in countries with a ‡oating currency and a closed capital account. This result re ‡ects the fact that the desire to raise the home policy rate following the foreign shock is strongest when a country has a pegged currency and an open capital account, and that capital account restrictions reduce the pressure on the home interest rate.
But what is interesting to note in …gure 5 is that the shocks necessary to keep the domestic policy rate …xed at zero are relatively small. The scale of the …gure is in basis points, and thus following a 100 b.p. shock to the foreign interest rate, the hypothetical shock to the domestic interest rate required to keep the domestic policy rate constant is at most 8 b.p.
per quarter in the few quarters following the shock. But this largest hypothetical shock dissipates relatively quickly, as it falls to around 6 b.p. after 2 years, and to 4 b.p. after 3 or 4 years.
The path of net capital out ‡ows (excluding reserves) following a shock to the foreign policy rate is presented in …gure 6. The blue impulse responses are the actual impulse responses discussed earlier in …gures 1-4, with the solid line depicting the point estimate of the response and the dotted lines showing 68% con…dence bands. The red dashed lines are the counterfactual response when the additional series of shocks to the home policy rate are fed into the model to keep the home policy rate constant.
In this setup, the gap between the red and blue lines in the …gure represent the amount of the increase in net capital out ‡ows that is mitigated by the endogenous response of domestic monetary policy. Controlling for the capital account regime (within columns), this gap is larger for the set of countries with a …xed exchange rate rather than ‡oating exchange rates. Alternatively, controlling for the exchange rate regime (within rows), this gap is larger for countries with an open capital account than with a closed capital account regime.
Importantly, the counterfactual response in the set of countries with pegged exchange rates and open capital accounts is the only counterfactual response that does not lie within the con…dence bands of the original impulse response. Quantitatively, for open peggers, the endogenous policy response seems to mitigate more than 1/3 of net out ‡ows at their peak.
After accounting for the endogenous policy response, the e¤ect of a foreign interest rate shock is quantitatively similar in both sets of countries with an open capital account; the 100 b.p. shock leads to about a 0.10-to-0.15% of GDP increase in net capital out ‡ows. Similarly, after accounting for the endogenous policy response, the e¤ect of a foreign interest rate shock is quantitatively similar in both sets of countries with a closed capital account; the 100 b.p.
shock leads to about a 0 to 0.05% of GDP increase in net capital out ‡ows.
Lucas Critique
Given our approach to compute counterfactual impulse responses, one natural question arises on whether these counterfactual simulations may run afoul of the Lucas Critique ( 
where for ease of notation, we have gone ahead and written the original VAR model as a
VAR (1) where the transition matrix is B 1 .
Let I t be the set of hypothetical policy interventions for the h periods (i.e., our hypo-thetical shocks to the domestic policy rate) following the shock to the foreign interest rate at time t, where the sequence I t = f" r;t ;" r;t+1 ; :::;" r;t+h g is plotted for our various country groups in …gure 5. Using this notation, one can express the vector of direct e¤ects of the counterfactual shocks to the home policy rate: The vector of modesty statistics, r;t+h , in Leeper and Zha (2003) scales this direct e¤ect r;t+h by its standard deviation, where the vector of standard deviations is given by square root of the diagonal of
Intuitively, the vector of direct e¤ects r;t+h measures the forecast error at horizon h due to the series of hypothetical shocks to the domestic interest rate between t and t + h. The modesty statistic then scales this forecast error by the square root of the historical forecast error variance. And thus the modesty statistic for variable i at horizon h asks if the forecast error of variable i due to the hypothetical shocks to the domestic interest rate between period t and t + h is large relative to the usual forecast error variance of variable i. If it is, then the counterfactual simulation runs afoul of the Lucas Critique, since the hypothetical shocks are large enough to be noticed by agents and causes agents to change their behavior. If it is not, the forecast errors due to the hypothetical shocks are small enough that they would not cause agents to change their behavior.
As de…ned by Leeper and Zha (2003) , the intervention is modest at horizon h for variable i if the absolute value of the i th element of the scaled direct e¤ect r;t+h is less than 2. These modesty statistics, r;t+h , for each of the 6 domestic variables in response to hypothetical 20 shocks to the domestic interest rate are presented in 
Conclusion
This paper shows that measuring the elasticity of net capital ‡ows to foreign monetary policy shocks is complicated by the endogenous responses of domestic monetary policy in a¤ected economies. In response to the current wave of monetary policy tightening in key advanced economies, such as the United States and the Euro Area, central banks in peripheral economies are likely to raise their policy interest rates in order to curtail a fall in capital in ‡ows and currency depreciation. However, the extent to which central banks will raise their policy rates in such a scenario is likely to depend on factors like the capital account and exchange rate regimes. Our results suggest that failing to account for the endogenous response of domestic monetary policy would bias down the estimated elasticity of net capital ‡ows to changes in foreign interest rates by as much as 1/4 for ‡oaters and more than 1/3
for peggers with open capital accounts.
Raising the domestic interest rate is not the only policy response of central banks to foreign monetary tightening, since central banks can also sell foreign exchange reserves to 21 arrest currency depreciation. Aizenman and Sun (2012) document and explain the size of reserve depletion in many emerging markets during the Global Financial Crisis. Davis (2017) uses a regression framework like that in Klein and Shambaugh (2015) to show that countries with high levels of foreign exchange reserves are less likely to move their domestic interest rate in response to a change in the foreign interest rate. Our results already show the extent to which various countries choose to let their currencies depreciate vs. sell foreign exchange reserves in response to the foreign interest rate shock. Therefore, one interesting expansion of our framework would be to consider that the response of foreign exchange reserves is itself an endogenous policy response, and examine if accounting for this additional endogenous policy action a¤ects the response of net capital ‡ows in the context of foreign monetary tightening shocks.
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